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ABSTRACT 
In this paper it is argued that nonterminating disagreements 
(such as those that Skinner and Rogers represent within the field of 
psychology) are likely to be associated with contrasting patterns of 
"implicit presuppositions." Nineteen subjects rated each of two 
essays, one by Skinner and the other by Rogers, on eleven bipolar 
presuppositions. There was consensus among raters that the 
Skinnerian and Rogerian positions contained significantly different 
presuppositions. An interpretation of disagreements between these two 
schools of psychology is offered in terms of the contrasting patterns 
of presuppositions that were identified. 
NONTERMINATING DISAGREEMENTS AND IMPLICIT PRESUPPOSITIONS: 
B. F. SKINNER AND CARL R. ROGERS* 
Margaret S. Faust, William L. Faust, Holly Mason Jones and W. T. Jones 
Nearly a quarter of a century ago a debate between B. F. 
Skinner and Carl R. Rogers was published in Science. In that debate, 
Skinner and Rogers disagreed about practically everything except for 
the applicability and usefulness of the empirical approch to the study 
of lruman issues. Despite the vast expansion of information and growth 
of knowledge in the field of psychology over the last 25 years, 
Skinner and Rogers are no closer together in their views today than 
they were when they first agreed to debate. If the same evidence is 
available to both, and it surely is, why don't these two psychologists 
resolve their differences on the basis of empirical data? It may be 
that such disagreements tend to persist because the same "facts" are 
interpreted differently by the disputants, as Hilgard (1956) has 
suggested. This seems to us a plausible hypothesis and one worth 
pursuing. In the series of studies of which this Working Paper is 
one, we argue that nonterminating disagreements of the kind 
represented by the Skinner-Rogers debate result, at least in part, 
from differences in implicit presuppositions -- presuppositions which, 
* We are grateful to Scripps College for a grant to the first 
author to support this research. 
although unstated and even unformulated, affect the nature and course 
of an argument. 
Our research to date has resulted in a set of eleven 
presuppositions which we have found useful in assessing many different 
kinds of disagreements, both within particular disciplines and across 
disciplines. Although in the present study we have asked our subjects 
to identify implicit presuppositions in the essays of two individual 
psychologists, we are less interested in the individual differences 
between Skinner and Rogers than we are in the differences between the 
two positions or "schools" that are represented in the controversy. 
So far as we know, ours is the first attempt to identify and assess 
empirically some of the contrasting presuppositions that underlie 
nonterminating disagreements between representatives of different 
"schools" of thought. 
METHOD 
The two essays selected for this study were "The Science of 
Learning and the Art of Teaching" (Skinner 1954) and "Significant 
Learning: In Therapy and in Education" (Rogers 1961). These essays 
were chosen rather than the symposium debate already mentioned because 
they are comparatively short essays in which Skinner and Rogers 
independently are discussing a concrete and delimited topic, namely 
education. We believed that it would be more useful to show that 
subjects could identify the unstated presuppositions in the focused 
essays than in the wide-ranging debate in which Skinner and Rogers are 
discussing directly their differences and similarities. 
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Nineteen undergraduate students from the Claremont Colleges! 
rated each of the essays on eleven bipolar "dimensions," or 
presuppositions. Table 1 presents a statement of the two poles of 
each dimension. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Each subject was given a packet containing instructions for 
rating, eleven rating scales, one to a page, and a copy of each essay. 
To introduce subjects to the rating procedure, they first were asked 
to read two short selections and to rate each on two dimensions which 
were not used in the study itself. When the subjects had completed 
the two illustrative ratings, they were asked to read and rate the 
Skinner and Rogers selections. The subjects were unaware of the 
hypotheses of this study. Each subject recorded his/her judgments by 
writing the names ("Skinner" and "Rogers") on the appropriate lines of 
the rating scale for each dimension. (See Figure 1 for a sample 
rating sheet.) 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Ratings A through E represent varying degrees of emphasis on the 
characteristics of one pole, and ratings V through Z represent varying 
degrees of emphasis on the characteristics of the contrasting pole. 
Ratings at the middle point of the scale indicate that an article was 
judged to reflect an equal emphasis on each pole of the dimension. 
We predicted that Skinner's position would be rated as 
reflecting the presuppositions listed in the left hand column of Table 
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2, and Rogers' article, correlatively, as reflecting the 
presuppositions listed in the right hand column. 
[Table 2 about here] 
RESULTS 
The data are presented in two ways: one is based on the 
direction of difference for each subject's ratings of the Skinner and 
Rogers essays on each of the eleven dimensions; the other is based on 
the median value obtained on each dimension for each essay. 
For the first analysis (which we call the "directions test") 
it was hypothesized that a significant majority of ratings would 
conform to the directional differences outlined in Table 2. The 
results are shown in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
As can be seen, all comparisons are in the predicted 
direction, and 10 of the 11 comparisons are statistically significant 
at p < .OS, and the other barely misses significance. This indicates 
that there is consensus among raters about the direction of the 
presuppositions that are implicit in the two essays. The unanimity of 
ratings on four of the dimensional differences is particularly 
impressive. 
The second analysis (which we call the "medians test") focuses 
on the degree of difference between the Skinnerian and Rogerian 
positions by considering the median value obtained by each author on 
each dimension. The data are presented in Figure 2. The amount of 
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dispersion around the medians is shown by corresponding scale values 
of the first and third quartiles in each instance. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
All dimensions except D-11 show median ratings for Skinner and 
Rogers that are distinctly different from each other. On ten of the 
dimensions the median ratings are not only quantitatively different; 
qualitatively they represent diametrically opposed implicit 
presuppositions. On eight dimensions the interquartile ranges for the 
two sets of ratings (Skinner and Rogers) do not even overlap. On two 
of the other three dimensions there is overlap in the distributions of 
ratings, but the medians are far apart. However, on D-11 there is 
only a one-step difference between the median ratings. Nevertheless, 
the "directions test" (Table 3) shows that a significant number of 
subjects assessed Skinner's essay as presupposing a somewhat more 
intelligible world than Rogers' essay. On all other dimensions the 
median ratings for the two were literally poles apart. 
DISCUSSION 
In what ways are the presuppositions related to the 
contrasting theoretical positions and research strategies of Skinner 
and Rogers? Here, we will discuss the relation of our findings to 
some of the issues on which the two schools of psychology take 
opposing positions. 
Skinner's view of the world and the people in it "presupposes" 
not only that the world is intelligible and relatively simple, but 
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that it can be understood best from an observer's perspective, e.g., 
by focusing on external characteristics (stimuli and responses) that 
are readily interpretable. In bis general model, Skinner rejects as 
unnecessary all intervening variables and hypothetical constructs. 
Stimuli and behavioral responses carry their own messages, and hence 
need little decoding. A state of rest or of stable equilibrium (i.e., 
the operant level) is presumed to be the basic condition. 
"Conditioning" is a reversible process; extinction procedures return 
the organism to the former stasis. It is changes in behavior that are 
explained by general principles of reinforcement, which apply equally 
well to all people or species. Psychologists of the Skinnerian 
"school" are predisposed to search for "reinforcers" that can 
effectively maintain a new operant level, once it has been produced. 
General reinforcement principles that are applied to units of behavior 
constitute specifiable means for achieving given ends. 
By contrast, Rogers' view of the world and the people in it 
"presupposes" that, although the world is basically intelligible, it 
is complex and can be understood best from the perspective of a 
participant. In understanding and explaining human behavior Rogerians 
focus on inner qualities (e.g., acceptance of feelings, positive 
regard, and phenomenal experience), almost to the exclusion of overt, 
observable responses. Whether analyzing education, creativity, or 
therapy, Rogerians emphasize process -- the process of "becoming" and 
of "self-actualization." Therefore, significant theoretical 
constructs characteristically are inferred from changes in the 
congruence of phenomenal experience, such as between one's perception 
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of ideal self and the self-concept. Human beings have the capacity 
for growth, self-regulation, evaluation of discrepant information, and 
self-determined choice; the capacity for sel f-determination is limited 
only by the information available to the decision process. For 
Rogerians, dynamic change is the norm; goals, ends, and purposes are 
open and always emerging. 
These two different "schools" or positions reach entirely 
different conclusions and recommendations on important policy matters, 
such as education. Here, for instance, is Skinner on the "principal 
task" of the school: 
The school is concerned with imparting to the child a 
large number of responses of a special sort • • • the 
principal task is to bring this behavior under many sorts 
of stimulus control. 
Skinner, 1954, p.89 
And here is Rogers: 
The motivation for learning and change springs from the 
self-actualizing tendency of life itself • • • students 
who are in real contact with life problems wish to learn, 
want to grow, seek to find out, hope to master, desire 
to create. 
Rogers, 1961, p. 289 
Rogerians and Skinnerians select different parameters on which 
to apply the methods of science and to gather "relevant'' evidence. 
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Whereas Skinnerians prefer to study changes in the latency, rate, or 
strength of responses in relation to specific reinforcement 
contingencies, Rogerians prefer to study self-direction, feelings, 
attitudes, and evaluations of the self in relation to others. For 
instance, in assessing outcomes of a given type of educational 
program, Skinnerians are concerned with specific behaviors that have 
been "shaped"; Rogerians, in contrast, are concerned with ·changes in 
self-initiated learning, creativity, or in attitudes toward oneself 
and toward others. The two schools adopt different presuppositions, 
attend to different parameters, and obtain different kinds of 
evidence. Each school assesses quite differently the relevance of and 
weight to be assigned to the same empirical "fact." A significant 
finding for one position is easily dismissed as irrelevant or 
uninterpretable by the other. 
We suggest that the association we have found between 
Skinner's and Rogers' positions on the presuppositions, on the one 
hand, and the contents of their two theories, or the other hand, 
arises because these presuppositions are fundamentally a part of the 
logic and reasoning by which they reach their position. Among the 
many factors influencing these positions, presuppositions, strategies 
of research, and interpretations of evidence are interacting 
components in the processes of logical thinking. Each component 
influences and is influenced by the others, and any one of these may 
change through transactions with the others. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It will come as no surprise to most psychologists that Skinner 
and Rogers represent different "schools" of thought. Indeed, it is 
fashionable today to talk about "paradigm clashes." What, then, is 
new about our approach to this issue? 
Most comparisons of schools and paradigms stop at description 
of differences in content, concepts, or method. Our effort bas been 
directed not only toward describing such differences but toward 
analyzing and explaining them in relation to a standard set of eleven 
presuppositions. This set of dimensions was developed in other 
contexts, for purposes quite remote from this analysis of 
disagreements between "schools" in psychology. These dimensions have 
been used in analyzing writings in intellectual history (Jones et al. , 
1980b), artistic products (in preparation) and public policy issues 
(Jones et al., 1980a). 
What is novel about our approach, then, is that (1) we have 
defined s set of presuppositions that are intelligible enough and 
unambiguous enough for an intelligent reader -- even one unacquainted 
with the particular subject area -- to use the definitions as an 
assessment tool, (2) we have developed an empirical method in which 
the rater who analyzes the works does not know the hypotheses that are 
being tested; therefore data and hypotheses are not confounded, (3) we 
have derived the presuppositions from controversies in diverse subject 
areas; the dimensions, therefore, are not ad hoc with respect to the 
Skinner-Rogers controversy or, for that matter, to any specific 
controversy. 
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What we have done in this paper is to test our beliefs about 
the underlying presuppositions of two psychological "schools," or 
"paradigms." Our empirical test of these beliefs has provided a 
method that is relatively independent of our mere "think-so," to use 
Kaplan's (1964) apt phrase. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge the help of Laurel Gray in the 
collection of data. 
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DIMENSION 1 
one end 
TABLE 1 
THE SET OF 11 IMPLICIT PRESUPPOSITIONS, 
OR "DIMENSIONS," USED IN THIS STUDY 
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- Emphasis on external aspects of the subject - for example, 
on social or economic status, external appearance, observ­
able behavior, interactions with others which depend upon 
relative status, role or position. 
other end - Emphasis on the inner life of the subject - for example, 
DIMENSION 2 
one end 
on mood, feeling, attitude, belief, desire, interactions 
with others which arise from personal or emotional concern . 
- Emphasis on depth of interpretation: the subject may be 
treated by indirect allusion, figures of speech; meaning 
may be implied or suggested in symbols, metaphors, alle­
gories so that, beyond the obvious surface meaning, there 
seems to be a "deeper" meaning that yields only to analy­
sis; several alternative meanings may be possible, among 
which it may be difficult to decide. 
other end - Emphasis on literal, surface meaning: the subject may be 
treated in precisely defined and relatively unambiguous terms; 
meaning may be expressed in relatively explicit form and 
requires less interpretation to be understood. 
DIMENSION 3 
one end - Emphasis on parts or elements of a whole, rather than on 
the whole itself. These parts are (or may be considered) 
independent of other parts. Parts themselves may be 
analyzed into constituent parts. 
other end - Emphasis on the whole, rather than on parts. The parts 
themselves may not be clearly distinguished; if they are, 
relations among them are emphasized, not their independence. 
DIMENSION 4 
one end - Emphasis on states of rest or of stable equilibrium. 
other end - Emphasis on change, motion or transitional states. 
DIMENSION 5 
one end - Emphasis on self-determination in the choices that a person 
makes that affect his/her own life; on the individual's power 
to change the course of events - a power that is attributable 
to qualities of th.e individual himself/herself. 
other end - Emphasis on the powerlessness of the individual to make the 
choices that affect his/her life; on the individual's lack 
of power to change the course of events - a lack of power that 
may be attributable either to qualities of the individual 
himself/herself, or to outer circumstances, or to both. 
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DIMENSION 6 
one end - Emphasis on the general, rather than on the particular; on 
what holds true for many individuals or for many cases; on 
what is not tied down to a particular person, place or date. 
other end - Emphasis on what is specific or particular; on the unique 
characteristics of some person, place or date . 
DIMENSION 7 
one end Emphasis on the point of view of an observer, of one who is 
uninvolved in, detached from, the subject matter. 
other end - Emphasis on the point of view of a participant, of one who 
feels involved in or concerned (positively or negatively) 
with the subject matter. 
DIMENSION 8 
one end - Emphasis on alternative or multiple means. 
other end - Emphasis on limited or specifiable means. 
DIMENSION 9 
one end - Emphasis on open or evolving ends. 
other end - Emphasis on fixed or given ends . 
DIMENSION 10 
one end - Emphasis on the position that the world seems fundamentally 
simple. 
other end - Emphasis on the position that the world seems fundamentally 
complex. 
DIMENSION 11 
one end - Emphasis on the position that the world seems intelligible. 
other end - Emphasis on the position that the world seems only partially 
intelligible or perhaps unintelligible. 
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TABLE 2 
PREDICTED DIRECTION OF DIFFERENCE IN RATINGS OF THE TWO ESSAYS 
D-1 
D-2 
D-3 
D-4 
D-5 
D-6 
D-7 
D-8 
D-9 
D-10 
D-11 
Skinner 
Outer (A-E) 
Surface (V-Z) 
Parts (A-E) 
Static (A-E) 
Powerlessness (V-Z) 
The general (A-E) 
Observer's perspective 
(A-E) 
Limited means (V-Z) 
Fixed, given ends (V-Z) 
Relatively simple world 
(A-E) 
Intelligible world 
(A-E) 
Rogers 
Inner (V-Z) 
Depth (A-E) 
Wholes (V-Z) 
Dynamic (V-Z) 
Self-determination (A-E) 
The particular (V-Z) 
Participant's perspective 
(V-Z) 
Alternative means (A-E) 
Open, evolving ends (A-E) 
Relatively complex world 
(V-Z) 
Only partially intelligible world 
(V-Z) 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO RATED THE SKINNER AND ROGERS POSITIONS 
IN THE DIRECTION PREDICTED, AS EQUIVALENT, OR IN THE 
DIRECTION CONTRARY TO THAT PREDICTED (N = 19) 
Predicted Opposite 
direction Equal direction 
D-1 19 0 0 
D-2 19 0 0 
D-3 13 0 6 
D-4 14 2 3 
D-5 18 1 0 
D-6 15 1 3 
D-7 19 0 0 
D-8 17 0 2 
D-9 19 0 0 
D-10 16 2 1 
D-11 13 2 4 
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p 
* 
* 
n.s. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*Significant at p < .05 by the Sign Test (Marascuilo, 1971, p. 523) . 
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FIGURE 1 
A SAMPLE RATING SHEET 
D-1 
Ratings at positions toward this end represent increasingly greater degrees 
of this characteristic: 
Emphasis on external aspects of the subject - for example, 
on social or economic status, external appearance, observ­
able behavior, interactions with others which depend upon 
relative status, role or position. 
A ______________ _ 
B �-------------�
c ---------------
D -------------
E ---------------
v --------------� 
w �-------------�
x ---------------
y -------------
z --------------� 
Emphasis on the inner life of the subject - for example, 
on mood, feeling, attitude, belief, desire, interactions 
with others which arise from personal or emotional concern. 
Ratings at positions toward this end represent increasingly greater degrees 
of this characteristic. 
I>-1 
I>-2 
I>-3 
I>-4 
I>-5 
I>-6 
Outer 
Depth 
Parts 
Static 
Self­
determinat ion 
General 
I>-7 Observer 
I>-8 Alternative 
means 
I>-9 Evolving ends 
D-10 Simplicity 
I>-ll Intelligible 
world 
FIGURE 2 
MEDIAN, Q1 AND Q3 SCALE VALUES FOR RATINGS OF ESSAYS BY SKINNER AND ROGERS 
A B c 
Skinner 
Q 
Med Q l 3 
Rogers 
D 
Q 
Med Q l 3 
Skinner 
E v w x y 
Rogers 
�3 l 
Skinner 
Q 
Med 
Q l 3 
Med 
3 l 
Med 3 l 
Rogers 
Skinner 
Med 
l 3 
Rogers 
�l 3 
Ql Med Q3 
Rogers 
Skinner 
Q 
Med Q l 3 
Skinner 
Rogers Med 
Q
Q
;....�������������_!Me�d�����
3 
Ql 
0
3 
l 
Skinner 
Q 
Med 
Q l 3 
Rogers 
Q
Hed Q l 3 
Rogers 
Q 
Med Q l 3 
Skinner 
Med 
l 3 
Skinner 
Q 
Med Q 
l 3 
Rogers 
�3 l 
Skinner 
Q 
Med 
Q l 3 
Skinner 
. Q Med Q l 3 
Rogers 
Q 
Med Q l 3 
l Med 3 
Rogers 
z 
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Inner 
Surface 
Whole 
Dynamic 
Powerlessness 
Particular 
Participant 
Limited means . 
Fixed ends 
Complexity 
Partially 
intelligible 
world 
